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I. INTRODUCTION
Microsoft is a global behemotht with billions of dollars of profit2 and tens of
thousands of employees worldwide It is a ubiquitous presence in the personal
computer operating systems market (PC market) with a greater than ninety
* J.D. Candidate, International Legal Studies Certificate, Intellectual Property Concentration, University
of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, 2009. I would like to thank my family and friends for their constant
support. This Comment is dedicated to my wife, Jeana.
1. Forbes, Forbes 2000, Mar. 30, 3006 http://www.forbes.com/lists/2006/18/06f2OOOThe-Forbes-
2000_MktVal.html (measured by market capitalization, Microsoft is the largest technology company in the
world and is the seventh largest company overall with a market capitalization of $253.15 billion).
2. Microsoft Corp., Fast Facts About Microsoft, http://www.microsoft.compresspass/insidefacts-
ms.mspx (last visited Nov. 1, 2008) (for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2008, Microsoft reported a profit of
$17.68 billion on revenue of $60.42 billion).
3. Id. (for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2008, Microsoft reported having 91,259 employees
worldwide).
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percent market share.' Microsoft produces the Windows operating system as well
as operating systems for the work group server market (server market).5
Microsoft enjoys a strong market share in the server market of more than fifty
percent.
6
In the past fifteen years, Microsoft has faced allegations of violations of
antitrust laws in both the United States7 and, more recently, in the European
Union ("EU").s The U.S. investigation, brought by the Department of Justice,
focused on Microsoft's behavior concerning its Windows operating system and
Internet Explorer web browser. 9 The U.S. case was settled by a consent decree' °
that will be analyzed in Part VIII. The European Commission ("Commission")
conducted the EU investigation' and focused primarily on Microsoft's behavior
concerning its server products starting with the Windows 2000 family of
products.' 2 The EU case ended with a judgment against Microsoft that required it
to disclose information to competitors and pay a substantial fine.3
The Microsoft antitrust cases '4 highlight the tension between antitrust and
intellectual property (IP) law. In both cases, Microsoft argued that its actions
were legal uses of its IP rights (IPRs).'5 The tension between IP and antitrust is a
question of the proper balance between IP's goal of ensuring innovation and
antitrust's goals of ensuring competition. 6 The two cases also highlight the
4. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 19 (D.D.C. 1999).
5. Microsoft Corp., Microsoft Server and Tools, http://www.microsoft.com/servers/os2.mspx (last
visited Nov. 1, 2008).
6. Paul Thurrot, OS Market Share: Microsoft Stomps the Competition, WINDOWSITPRo, Oct. 9, 2003,
http://www.windowsitpro.com/article/articleid/4048 I/os-market-share-microsoft-stomps-the-competition.html
(in 2002, Windows Server products owned 55.1 percent of the market, from a unit-shipment standpoint, up from
50.5 percent in 2001).
7. Complaint, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000) (No. 98-1232),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/fl 700/1763.pdf.
8. Press Release, European Union, Comm'n Opens Proceedings Against Microsoft's Alleged Discri-
minatory Licensing and Refusal to Supply Software Info. (Aug. 3, 2000), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/
pressReleasesAction.do?reference=lP/00/906&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
9. Complaint, supra note 7, 12.
10. United States v. Microsoft Corp. (Microsoft II1), No. 98-1232, 2006 WL 2882808 (D.D.C. Sep. 7,
2006).
11. Europa, European Union Institutions and Other Bodies: The European Commission, http://europa.
eu/ institutions/inst/comm/index en.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2008). "The European Commission is the E.U.'s
executive arm, it is responsible for implementing the decisions of Parliament and the Council .... The European
Commission has four main roles: 1. to propose legislation to Parliament and the Council; 2. to manage and
implement E.U. policies and the budget; 3. to enforce European law (jointly with the Court of Justice); 4. to
represent the European Union on the international stage, for example by negotiating agreements between the
E.U. and other countries." Id.
12. Commission Decision COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft, C(2004)900, available at http://ec.europa.
eu/comm/ competition/antitrust/cases/decisions/37792/en.pdf.
13. Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm'n, 2007 E.C.R. 00.
14. Commission Decision, supra note 12; United States v. Microsoft Corp. (Microsoft 1), 87 F. Supp. 2d
30 (D.D.C. 2000).
15. See Commission Decision, supra note 12; Microsoft 1, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 9.
16. See I HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES
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different views of the U.S. and EU over the discord between IP and antitrust
laws. 7 The divergent views concern the extent to which antitrust laws should be
used to correct improperly granted or overbroad IP rights.
This Comment will analyze the U.S. and EU antitrust cases as well as the
policies of the two jurisdictions concerning IP and antitrust law. Part II provides
an overview of the Commission decision in the EU case. Part III discusses the
economic theory pertinent to the IP/antitrust tension. Part IV discusses the U.S.
policy regarding IP and antitrust. Part V discusses the likely outcome of the EU
case under U.S. law. Part VI discusses the EU policy regarding IP and antitrust.
Part VII discusses the EU decision and the change in EU IP/antitrust law that it
represents. Part VIII discusses the effect of the decision.
This Comment argues the effect of this decision will be two-fold: (1)
competition in the technology and software industries will increase and (2) the
EU will become the dominant regulatory body with which technology and
software companies must contend.
II. EU CASE OVERVIEW
On December 10, 1998, Sun Microsystems (Sun) applied to the Commission
to initiate proceedings against Microsoft.'9 Sun alleged Microsoft held a
dominant position in the personal computer operating systems market in the EU.2 °
Sun further alleged Microsoft abused this dominant position by withholding
information necessary to allow non-Microsoft work group servers to fully
interoperate 2' with Windows-based client PCs.2 Sun considered Microsoft's
action a violation of Article 82 of the Treaty establishing the European
Community (EC Treaty).
23 The Commission opened a case on August 1, 200014
and launched an investigation into Microsoft's conduct focusing on the Windows
2000 generation of PC and work group server operating systems.
25
The Commission issued its decision on March 24, 2004.26 After providing the
background information for the case 2' and a thorough technical explanation of the
APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 1.3 (Aspen 2002 & Supp. 2008).
17. See Katarzyna A. Czapracka, Where Antitrust Ends and IP Begins-On the Roots of the Transatlantic
Clashes, 9 YALE J.L. & TECH. 44 (2007).
18. See id.
19. Commission Decision, supra note 12, 3.
20. Id.
21. Id. 32 (the Commission defined interoperability as "functional interconnection and interaction ... .
22. ld. 3.
23. Treaty Establishing the European Community, art. 82, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 209 (Article
82 prohibits "any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common market.").
24. Commission Decision, supra note 12,1 4.
25. Id. 5.
26. Commission Decision, supra note 12.
27. Id. U 3-13.
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products and markets,28 the Commission discussed the specific interoperability
information requested by Sun 29 and Microsoft's denial of the request.30 It also
discussed Microsoft's behavior regarding interoperability information for
Windows PC operating systems and work group server operating systems.3'
The Commission found Microsoft denied Sun's request for disclosure32 and
that the value of the information requested by Sun derived from Microsoft's
dominant position in the PC market.33 The Commission rejected Microsoft's
argument that Sun was seeking disclosure of source code and found Sun was
seeking disclosure of interoperability specifications. The Commission also
found Microsoft's failure to disclose the specifications was part of a pattern of
behavior.35 It concluded Microsoft's behavior was a disruption of supply;
Microsoft had supplied similar specifications for previous generations of client
36PC operating systems.
According to the Commission's decision, an essential objective of IP law is
to stimulate creativity for the general public good. 3 After establishing that
Microsoft's refusal to supply interoperability information created the risk of
eliminating competition, the Commission assessed whether the effect of
disclosure on Microsoft's incentive to innovate outweighed the effect of the
failure to disclose on the market and consumers."
Addressing Microsoft's contention that the requested interoperability
information is protected intellectual property, the Commission held, "a detailed
examination of the scope of the disclosure at stake leads to the conclusion that,
on balance, the possible negative impact of an order to supply on Microsoft's
incentives to innovate is outweighed by its positive impact on the level of
innovation of the whole industry."39 With regard to Microsoft's claim it had no
incentive to engage in anti-competitive conduct, the Commission found it "[was]
not supported-and in fact is largely contradicted-by the evidence in this
case.
4 °
After addressing Microsoft's arguments that its behavior was objectively
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information violates Article 82 of the [EC] Treaty."'4' The Commission found: (1)
interoperability with the Windows domain architecture is necessary for a server
operating system vendor to viably stay on the market;42 (2) Microsoft has
decreased the disclosure it makes about interoperability information;4 (3) there is
a risk of elimination of competition in the server market;" (4) there is no actual
or potential substitute for disclosure of the interoperability information;45 and (5)
Microsoft's refusal to supply stifles innovation in the affected market.46
Microsoft appealed the Commission's finding to the Court of First Instance
(CFI).47 The Court issued its ruling on September 17, 200748 upholding the
Commission's conclusion that Microsoft abused its dominant position in
violation of Article 82 of the EC Treaty.49 Microsoft has decided not to appeal the
Court of First Instance decision.50
III. ECONOMIC THEORY
Before discussing the EU Microsoft case and its implications, it is necessary
to outline the applicable economic theory. Important to this discussion of
economic theory is the recognition that IP and antitrust laws serve distinct
purposes. The goal of patents is to provide incentive to innovate by giving the
patent holder a limited right to exclude others from using the invention. 52
Antitrust, on the other hand, attempts to ensure competition by declaring certain







47. Microsoft Corp., 2007 E.C.R. 00. "The Court of First Instance is an appellate level judicial body
within the European Union. The Court of First Instance can hear appeals of decisions from the European
Commission. The Court of First Instance has jurisdiction to hear: direct actions brought by natural or legal
persons against acts of Community institutions (addressed to them or directly concerning them as individuals)
or against a failure to act on the part of those institutions, for example, a case brought by a company against a
Commission decision imposing a fine on that company ... The rulings made by the Court of First Instance may,
within two months, be subject to an appeal, limited to questions of law, to the Court of Justice." Europa, The
Court of First Instance, http://curia.europa.eu/en/instit/presentationfr/index_tpi. htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2008).
48. Microsoft Corp., 2007 E.C.R. 00.
49. Id.
50. Steve Lohr & Kevin J. O'Brien, Microsoft is Yielding in European Antitrust Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
23, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/23/technology/23soft.html.
51. Nicholas Economides & William N. Hebert, Patents and Antitrust: Application to Adjacent Markets
3 (NET Inst., Working Paper No. 07-07, 2007).
52. Id.
53. Id.
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the differing goals of IP and antitrust, there is a certain degree of tension between
the two bodies of law.54
Antitrust law is designed to ensure competition in order to ensure
maximization of efficiency.55 Antitrust law is concerned with three efficiencies:
productive, allocative and dynamic. 6 Productive efficiency exists when costs are
minimized; allocative efficiency exists when market prices are close to
incremental production costs; dynamic efficiency exists when the appropriate
amount of innovation is present in the market.57 Decrease in competition results
in a loss of allocative efficiency; this loss is tolerated on the theory that the short-
term monopoly profits guaranteed by the patent provide the appropriate incentive
for individuals to engage in innovative activity." After all, monopoly profits are
"the baits that lure capital on to untried trails."
59
Antitrust issues arise when a patent holder uses its monopoly power in the
patented market to exclude competitors in a different market, a practice known as
monopoly leveraging. 6° In a working paper for the NET Institute, Professor
Economides and his co-author Hebert provide a particularly clear discussion of
the economic conditions necessary to enable monopoly leveraging. 6 ' First, firm A
has a patent and monopoly on good 1.62 Second, there is an adjacent market that
produces goods complementary to good 163 Firm A's patent on good 1 allows it
to control the interface of good 1 and, by extension, the degree to which good 1
and good 2 are complementary. Thus, firm A's patent on good 1 allows it to
leverage that monopoly and extend it to the market for good 2.65
To illustrate the way in which Microsoft can leverage its monopoly in the PC
market into the server market consider the following example. Suppose firm A
has a monopoly on a patented bolt. Let us further assume firm A also
manufactures nuts that connect to the patented bolt but that the market for nuts is
competitive. If any nut can firmly connect to firm A's patented bolt, then firm A
will be forced to compete in the competitive market for nuts. If, however, firm A
modifies the design of the bolt so that only firm A's nut can make a firm
54. Harvey 1. Saferstein, Patent Licensing and the Antitrust Laws, in PATENT LAW INSTITUTE 2007: THE
IMPACT OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS ON YOUR PRACTICE, at I (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and
Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series, 2007).
55. Economides & Hebert, supra note 5 1. For an overview of the economics of antitrust, see HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 2-25 (3d ed. 2005).
56. Economides & Hebert, supra note 51.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 4.
59. Harry First, Microsoft and the Evolution of the Intellectual Property Concept, 2006 Wis. L. REV.
1369, 1374 (quoting J. A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 90 (3d ed. 1950)).
60. Economides & Hebert, supra note 51, at 4-5.
61. Economides & Hebert, supra note 51.
62. Id. at 9.
63. Id.
64. ld. at 10.
65. id.
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connection with the patented bolt, firm A can use its monopoly on the patented
bolt to improperly diminish competition in the market for nuts.
In the EU case, Microsoft argued it "'[was] highly implausible that [it] had
... the incentive to foreclose competitors through leveraging in the ways
suggested by [the Commission].' ' '66 Microsoft based its argument on the one
monopoly profit theory.6 This theory holds "there is a 'single monopoly profit'
in the combination of a sale of [good 1] with [good 2], and therefore any
leveraging of the monopoly in [the] market [for good 1 to the] market [for good
2] cannot be attributed to anti-competitive motivations., 68 However, according to
more modem economic theory, the one monopoly profit theory "holds only in
very exceptional circumstances." 69 For the one monopoly profit theory to hold,
good 1 and good 2 must be "combined in a fixed and constant ratio ... each
buyer buys only one unit, there is perfect foresight, the market in good [2] is
competitive and the goods are produced with constant returns to scale. 70 Some
commentators argue that when the markets allegedly being monopolized are
entered into simultaneously (market for nuts and bolts), the traditional theory of
leveraging does not hold.7' However, when the markets are entered into
consecutively (computer users moving from applications accessed through
operating system to applications accessed through a web browser), the possibility
for leveraging may exist.
72
The Commission found two flaws with Microsoft's application of the one
monopoly profit theory.73 First, the Commission found the PC and server markets
are not perfect complements with fixed ratios 4 Second, the Commission noted
the theory does not hold when limiting competition in market 2 reinforces the
dominant undertaking's position in market 1 because "by strengthening its
dominant position in the [server] market, Microsoft effectively reinforces the
barriers to entry in the [PC] market., 75 Accordingly, the Commission held
"Microsoft has incentives to leverage its market power from the [PC] market into
the [server] market. 76
66. Commission Decision, supra note 12,1 764.
67. Id. 1765.
68. Economides & Hebert, supra note 51, at 11. For a thorough discussion of monopoly leveraging see
Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19 (1957) (arguing
monopoly leveraging is not possible because there is only one monopoly rent to be gained) and compare with
Louis Kaplow, Extension of Monopoly Power Through Leverage, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 515 (1985) (arguing
monopoly leveraging is possible).
69. Economides & Hebert, supra note 51, at 11.
70. Id. at II n.33.
71. HOVENKAMP, supra note 55, at 420-23.
72. Id. at 423.
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Society provides the temporary monopoly in the market for good 1 to
provide the theoretically exact amount of incentive necessary to promote the
production of good L" In Microsoft's case, market 1 is the market for the
Windows operating system and market 2 is the server operating system market.
The extension of the monopoly in the patented market to a new market is
problematic because it provides the firm with more monopoly profit than is
intended by the patent." The extra monopoly profit Microsoft receives is two-
fold. First, it receives the monopoly profit from market 2 that it is able to derive
from its patent in market 1. Second, by raising the barriers to entry to market 1,
Microsoft is able to extract more monopoly profit from market 1 than it could
without the increased barriers to entry.
IV. U.S. IP/ANTITRUST POLICY
In the U.S., antitrust actions are governed by section 2 of the Sherman Act,79
which prohibits "monopoliz[ing] or attempt[ing] to monopolize.., any part of
the trade or commerce."' According to the Supreme Court, a violation of section
2 requires, in addition to possession of monopoly power, "the willful acquisition
or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a
consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident."'"
Monopoly power is defined as "the power to.. . exclude competition. 82
Accordingly, the Sherman Act prohibits using monopoly power "to foreclose
competition, to gain a competitive advantage, or to destroy a competitor.
'8
1
The Supreme Court has noted that generally, the Sherman Act does not
restrict the right of a firm to choose the parties with whom it will deal.8
Furthermore, monopoly power is not unlawful unless it is "accompanied by an
element of anticompetitive conduct."85 Moreover, the Court did note, "[u]nder
certain circumstances, a refusal to cooperate with rivals can constitute
anticompetitive conduct. 8 6 However, the Court is "very cautious"7  about
recognizing these exceptions.
77. Economides & Hebert, supra note 51, at 10.
78. Id.
79. 15 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West 2008) (through Pub. L. No. 110-448 but excluding Pub .L. No. 110-343, 110-
417, 110-432,110-437).
80. Id.
81. Verizon Commc'ns v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004) (quoting
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966)).
82. David A. Balto & Andrew M. Wolman, Intellectual Property and Antitrust: General Principles, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ANTITRUST 2006, at 18 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Prop.
Course Handbook Series, 2006) (quoting United States v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391
(1956)).
83. Id. (quoting Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs. Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 482-83 (1992)).
84. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 408.
85. Id. at 407.
86. Id. at 408.
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A. Refusal to Deal
Two Supreme Court cases hold that the unilateral refusal by one firm to deal
with a competitor can violate antitrust law: Kodak f 8 and Aspen Skiing Co. v.
Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.89 In Kodak I, the Court considered a claim by a
group of independent service organizations (ISOs) that Kodak had violated
antitrust law by refusing to sell the ISOs repair parts for Kodak copiers; the ISOs
claimed Kodak did this to gain a monopoly in the market for service of Kodak
copiers.9 Kodak I put forward two important propositions: it recognized a firm
could be subject to antitrust liability for using its properly gained monopoly
power in one market to leverage into another market9' and it recognized that
Kodak's behavior could give rise to a section 2 claim if it was part of a "scheme
of willful acquisition or maintenance of monopoly power. 92 Kodak I has been
described as an "aggressive" 93 decision and some suggest it should be overruled.94
The majority of courts have "constru[ed] Kodak narrowly" in a number of ways
suggested by Hovenkamp in his hornbook on antitrust.9
The second case, Aspen, is important both for its finding of antitrust liability
for refusal to deal and its discussion of the essential facilities doctrine that will be
explored in the next section. Aspen involved two competing ski resorts: Ski Co.,
which owned three of the four mountains available for skiing in a geographic
area, and Highlands Skiing, which owned the other mountain.96 The dispute arose
when Ski Co. stopped participating in a joint ski pass that allowed skiers to
purchase one pass and have access to all four mountains.97 The Court found that
"the absence of an unqualified duty to cooperate" did not mean this "may not
have evidentiary significance" or that it "may not give rise to liability in certain
circumstances." 98 Since Ski Co. was not able to provide a valid business
justification for discontinuing its participation in the joint program, the Court
found liability under section 2.99
87. Id.
88. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc. (Kodak 1), 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
89. 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
90. Kodak 1, 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
91. Id. at 479 n.29.
92. Id. at 483.
93. HOVENKAMP, supra note 55, at 297.
94. Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago Antitrust: A Review and Critique, 2001 COLUM. BUS. L. REV.
257.
95. HOVENKAMP, supra note 55, at 302-03; but see Warren S. Grimes, Antitrust Tie-In Analysis After
Kodak: Understanding the Role of Market Imperfections, 62 ANTITRUST LJ. 263 (1994) (arguing for expanded
liability under Kodak 1).
96. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 589 (1985).
97. Id. at 593.
98. Id. at 601.
99. Aspen, 472 U.S. 585.
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Three cases further illustrate the U.S. policy concerning antitrust and
intellectual property: Kodak H,'00 ISO 10' and Verizon Communications v. Law
Offices of Curtis V. Trinko.'02
In Kodak H, the Ninth Circuit interpreted the Supreme Court's holding in
Kodak iP03 that a refusal by a patent holder to license was subject to a rebuttable
presumption that the refusal was harmful to consumers. '° The court stated that
"'exploit[ing] [a] dominant position in one market to expand [the] empire into the
next' is broad enough to cover monopoly leveraging under § 2." °0 The court
noted the desire to exclude competitors by not licensing is a "presumptively valid
business justification, "1 6 but that a showing of the monopolist's state of mind or
subjective motivations can rebut this presumption. 07
In ISO I, the Federal Circuit took a different approach than the Ninth Circuit.
The court held that the patent holder may exclude competitors without incurring
antitrust liability except under very limited circumstances such as illegal tying,
fraud or sham litigation. '°8 In a related case, the Circuit stated, "where a
patent... has been lawfully acquired, subsequent conduct... permissible under
the patent ... laws cannot give rise to liability under the antitrust laws," and that
"[a] patentee may unilaterally exclude others.., even if such conduct allows the
patentee to obtain monopolies in multiple markets. ' 9
In Trinko, the Supreme Court significantly limited the circumstances under
which a firm can be required to license intellectual property. The Court rejected
plaintiff's claim because it did "not believe that traditional antitrust principles
justify adding the present case to the few existing exceptions from the
proposition that there is no duty to aid competitors."' "0 Trinko, like Aspen, is
important for both its discussion of traditional antitrust principles and its
discussion of the essential facilities doctrine that will be explored in the next
section."' The opinion is notable because of the strong tone used throughout in
favor of limited antitrust intervention and liability."2 The Court described Aspen
100. Image Technical Servs. v. Eastman Kodak Co. (Kodak I1), 125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997).
101. CSU, L.L.C. v. Xerox Corp., 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000) [hereinafter ISO I].
102. 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
103. Kodakl, 504U.S. 451 (1992).
104. Id. at 480 n.29.
105. Kodak H, 125 F.3d at 1216 (quoting Kodak 1, 504 U.S. at 479 n.29).
106. Id. (quoting Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1187 (1st Cir. 1994)).
107. Id. at 1219.
108. ISO 1, 203 F.3d at 1327-28.
109. In re Indep. Servs. Org. Antitrust Litig., 114 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1088-89 (D. Kan. 2000) [hereinafter
ISO M1].
110. Verizon Commc'ns v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 411 (2004).
111. Seeid. at410-411.
112. Id. at 415-16 (the opinion notes that while the Sherman Act is the "'Magna Cart of free
enterprise,"' quoting U.S. v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972), it "does not give judges carte
blanche to insist that a monopolist alter its way of doing business whenever some other approach might yield
greater competition." (emphasis in original)).
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as "at or near the outer boundary of § 2 liability""' 3 and noted the Court was "very
cautious" about recognizing exceptions to the general rule against requiring a
firm to cooperate with its competitors. 4 The Court further cautioned against
antitrust intervention noting that "[u]nder the best of circumstances, applying the
requirements of § 2 'can be difficult""' 5 and that the "cost of false positives
counsels against an undue expansion of § 2 liability."
' ' 6
B. Essential Facilities Doctrine
The essential facilities doctrine requires licensing of intellectual property to
competitors when a refusal to license makes it impossible for competitors to
compete with the dominant entity." 7 The doctrine arguably has its roots in U.S. v.
Terminal R.R. Ass'n"' where the court found an antitrust violation involving
railroad facilities that were deemed essential to being able to operate in the St.
Louis railroad market; however, it has been noted the case makes a poor
argument for section 2 liability because it involved concerted action, which is a
violation of section 1.'"9 The first Supreme Court case to use the doctrine to find a
section 2 violation was Otter Tail Power Co. v. U.S.120 where the Court found a
public utility's refusal to distribute power for municipal utility companies that
wanted to supply their own electricity by purchasing it elsewhere violated section
.121
The most direct, clear application of the essential facilities doctrine came in
MCI Communications Corp. v. AT & T.2 1 In MCI, the Seventh Circuit outlined a
four part test for invoking the doctrine: (1) control of the essential facility by a
monopolist; (2) a competitor's inability, practically or reasonably, to duplicate
the essential facility; (3) the denial of the use of the essential facility to a
competitor; and (4) the feasibility of providing the essential facility.
1
As mentioned earlier, the two recent Supreme Court cases of Aspen and
Trinko both addressed the extent to which the essential facilities doctrine
influences U.S. IP and antitrust law. In Aspen, the Court did not directlyaddress the issue because it found it was "unnecessary to consider the possible
113. Id. at 409.
114. Id. at 408.
115. Id. at 414 (quoting U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001)).
116. ld. at414.
117. See Czapracka, supra note 17, at 51.
118. 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
119. HOVENKAMP, supra note 55, at 309.
120. 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
121. Id.
122. 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983).
123. Id. at 1132-33.
124. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp 472 U.S. 585, 611 n.44 (1985); Verizon
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relevance of the 'essential facilities' doctrine."'' 5 Similarly, in Trinko, the Court
did not specifically address the applicability of the doctrine. Instead, the Court
took a narrow view of the doctrine holding it "[has] never recognized such a
doctrine.., and we find no need... to recognize it."'26 In dicta, the Court
elaborated that it would probably apply the doctrine in very narrow
circumstances that are unlikely to apply in most cases."'
The essential facilities doctrine has been strongly criticized by commentators
in the U.S. 28 Professor Areeda derides the doctrine as "so-called ... because
most Supreme Court cases invoked in support do not speak of it and can be
explained without reference to it."'29 Professor Hovenkamp is more strident in his
criticism describing the doctrine as "one of the most troublesome, incoherent and
unmanageable of bases for Sherman section 2 liability."'30 He further suggests
"[tihe antitrust world would almost certainly be a better place if it were
jettisoned."'' According to Hovenkamp, "the doctrine is either superfluous or
else inconsistent with basic antitrust principles."'3 As will be discussed later, the
position of the U.S. courts and commentators stands in stark contrast to Europe
where the doctrine is recognized and has "been steadily growing in
significance."13
V. EU MICROsoFT CASE UNDER U.S. LAW
If the EU Microsoft case were decided under current U.S. law, the result
would be significantly different from that reached by the Commission and upheld
by the Court of First Instance. The case would likely be analyzed using the tests
and reasoning from ISO I and ISO I. Trinko and the court's treatment of the
essential facilities doctrine would also govern the decision. A claim for antitrust
liability may be possible under Kodak I or Aspen, but the likelihood of success is
not high.
Microsoft would not incur antitrust liability under the ISO tests or under
Trinko. The first two circumstances that produce liability are not satisfied
because there was no allegation of illegal tying concerning servers or fraud. The
third circumstance is not satisfied because Microsoft did not sue Sun or any other
competitor to which it denied interoperability information. The essential facilities
125. Aspen, 472 U.S. at 611 n.44.
126. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 411.
127. Id.
128. See Phillip Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, 58 ANTITRUST
L.J. 841 (1989); HOVENKAMP, supra note 55, at 309.
129. Areeda, supra note 128, at 841.
130. HOVENKAMP, supra note 55, at 309.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 313 (explaining how the doctrine requires price administration by the court and undercuts
incentives of competitors to develop alternative sources of supply).
133. Czapracka, supra note 17, at 52.
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doctrine, if recognized at all, would be given a very narrow reading in accord
with Trinko. This would present a significant obstacle to a successful claim
against Microsoft, as the three categories of ISO I cannot be satisfied. Therefore,
Microsoft's behavior, despite the potential for monopoly leveraging, would not
incur antitrust liability under ISO I or Trinko. This is precisely the situation
considered and expressly allowed by the Federal Circuit in ISO II.
'3
4
The cases most likely to support a finding of section 2 liability if the EU
Microsoft case were tried in the U.S. would be Kodak I and Aspen. Both these
cases support a broader reading of when a firm has a duty to deal with a
competitor and can incur antitrust liability for failure to do so. However, a court
considering the current Microsoft case would likely differentiate both Aspen and
Kodak I. The influence of Aspen has been significantly limited by Trinko's
description of Aspen as at the edges of section 2 liability and its refusal to
recognize the limitation of the essential facilities doctrine. After Trinko, it is
doubtful whether Aspen is strong enough to support a section 2 claim based on
the essential facilities doctrine.
Trinko also suggests that a section 2 claim under Kodak I would be difficult.
The clear, almost strident tone of Trinko strongly supports limiting antitrust
intervention whenever possible. This stands in stark contrast to the
"aggressive"'35 Kodak I decision. Furthermore, Kodak I likely would be
distinguished on its facts. In Kodak I, Kodak controlled the market for copier
repair parts since only Kodak parts would work on Kodak machines. 3 6 This
allowed Kodak to foreclose competition from ISOs by refusing to sell them
repair parts. Although the denial of interoperability information by Microsoft
negatively affected the other competitors in the server market, Microsoft was not
able to foreclose competition in the server market by denying the interoperability
information. This factual difference, as well as Trinko's admonition about the
danger of overzealous antitrust intervention, suggests Kodak I would not support
a section 2 claim in the current Microsoft case.
The best prediction of how the current Microsoft case would be decided can
be gained through an analysis of the U.S. antitrust case against Microsoft in the
late 1990s. At first glance, the U.S. Microsoft decision would seem to suggest a
court would find liability in the current case; after all, the D.C. District Court did
find Microsoft guilty of a section 2 violation.'33 However, a closer examination of
the case reveals the current case would not be found a section 2 violation.
In Microsoft I, the District Court articulated a three part liability test for
attempted monopolization under section 2: "' 1) that the defendant has engaged in
predatory or anticompetitive conduct with 2) a specific intent to monopolize,'
and 3) that there is a 'dangerous probability' that the defendant will succeed in
134. ISO 11, 114 F. Supp. 2d 1070 (D. Kan. 2000).
135. HOVENKAMP, supra note 55, at 297.
136. Kodak 1, 504 U.S. 451, 456-57 (1992).
137. Microsoft 1, 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000).
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achieving monopoly power. ' The dangerous probability requirement is a
significantly higher standard than the risk of elimination of competition standard
required under Article 82 analysis. The finding of attempted monopolization in
Microsoft I was based on Microsoft's position in the web browser market where
the dangerous probability standard was clearly satisfied. 9 While Microsoft has
gained a strong position in the server market because of its anticompetitive
behavior, it is doubtful the dangerous probability standard could be satisfied.
The decision of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in the Microsoft case'
°4
casts further doubt on the success of a claim in the current case. In Microsoft II,
the D.C. Circuit restated the Spectrum Sports three-part test for determining
liability regarding attempted monopolization; however, it reversed the District
Court's finding of liability for attempted monopolization under section 2.14' The
Court found "a pervasive flaw in the District Court's and plaintiffs' discussion of
attempted monopolization."'4 2 "Simply put, plaintiffs have made the same
argument under two different headings-monopoly maintenance and attempted
monopolization. They have relied upon Microsoft's § 2 liability for
monopolization of the operating system market as a presumptive indicator of
attempted monopolization of an entirely different market."' 43 While the browser
market at issue in Microsoft I and Microsoft H does not have identical economic
characteristics as the server market at issue in the EU decision, it is likely that a
section 2 attempted monopolization claim would also be rejected by the D.C.
Circuit.
VI. EU IP/ANTITRUST POLICY
Article 82 of the EC Treaty prohibits "any abuse by one or more
undertakings of a dominant position within the common market."'" According to
the Court of Justice of the European Communities (ECJ), a dominant position
under Article 82 of the EC Treaty is "a position of economic strength enjoyed by
an undertaking which enables it to prevent effective competition being
maintained on the relevant market by affording it the power to behave to an
appreciable extent independently of its competitors, its customers and ultimately
of the consumers."''4 5 The Commission demonstrated Microsoft is able to control
the quasi-standard of the PC market, and thus holds a dominant position that
138. Id. at 45 (quoting Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447,456 (1993)).
139. Id. at 45-46.
140. United States v. Microsoft Corp. (Microsoft I1), 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
141. Id. at 80-84.
142. Id. at 80.
143. Id. at 80-81.
144. Treaty Establishing the European Community, supra note 23.
145. Case 27/76, United Brands v. Comm'n, 1978 E.C.R. 207, 1 65.
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exhibits extraordinary features.'4 6 Microsoft Windows is not only a dominant
product on the PC market; it is the de facto standard.
4 7
An entity with a dominant position in a market is not automatically in
violation of competition laws.' 8 However, the entity is under a "special
responsibility" not to engage in conduct that may affect competition.'
49
Undertakings are generally free to choose their business partners.50 However, a
refusal by a dominant entity to supply information may constitute an abuse of
dominant position.5 '
The Software Directive 52 provides guidance to resolve the tension between
antitrust and IP in the technology area. Article 6 of the Directive addresses
interoperability and outlines the requirements of a firm to provide interoperability
information. 5 3 The Directive also expressly provides that its terms do not
preclude antitrust liability under EU competition law.
54
The refusal by the owner of an exclusive right to grant a license may, in
exceptional circumstances, constitute abusive conduct.'55 In the IMS case, the ECJ
provided a "comprehensive pronouncement"' 5 6 on what conditions would satisfy
the exceptional circumstances requirement that would make refusal to license
abusive behavior.'57 The Court held that refusal to license by a dominant
company constitutes abusive behavior when four cumulative conditions are met:
(1) the product or service is indispensable to compete in a particular market; (2)
the refusal will exclude competition on a secondary market; (3) the refusal
prevents the emergence of a new product for which there is potential consumer
demand; and (4) the refusal is not objectively justified.'
5
1
The IMS decision "illustrates a trend in the Court's case law to set higher
standards for compulsory licensing under Article 82."'"9 The Court held the
essential facilities doctrine cannot be applied "simply because rival firms are not
capable of competing with the product incorporating IP." Unless there is
"complete foreclosure of the secondary market" and "the refusal to license
146. Commission Decision, supra note 12,1 429.
147. Id.[ 472.
148. Id. 542.
149. Case 322/81, Michelin v. Comm'n, 1983 E.C.R. 3461,1 57.
150. Commission Decision, supra note 12, 1 547.
151. Id.
152. Council Directive 91/250, 1991 O.J. (L 122) 42.
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prevents the emergence of a new product," the balance between IP and antitrust
tips in favor of IP.' 6o
VII. EU MICROSOFT DECISION
Microsoft argued disclosure of the interoperability information would "upset
the 'careful balance between copyright and competition policies' struck by the
Software Directive."' 6' Before addressing Microsoft's argument, the Commission
noted the EC Treaty, not the Software Directive, governed the case.' 62 In fact, the
Software Directive is secondary legislation and cannot supersede the EC
Treaty. 163
The Commission began its discussion of the Directive by discussing Article
6.' 64 The Commission found Article 6 "limits a copyright-holder's rights in
favour of interoperability, whether the copyright-holder is dominant or not.'
' 65
The Commission found that given "Microsoft's extraordinary market strength as
well as the other exceptional circumstances in this case ... Microsoft has an
obligation to actively supply interface information to other work group server
operating system vendors."'
' 66
Next, the Commission addressed Microsoft's argument that this is not a case
governed by the interoperability disclosure requirements of the Directive.
6 7
Microsoft argued the information requested by Sun was "a degree of
interoperability that [was] too high and [went] beyond the 'full interoperability'
that would be contemplated by the Software Directive.' 68 Microsoft argued full
interoperability as envisioned by the Directive is achieved when "'all of the
functionality of [a] program can be accessed from a Windows client operating
system.""'6 9 The Commission noted Microsoft's definition of full interoperability
could be interpreted to require nothing more than partial interoperability.'7 ° The
Commission rejected Microsoft's decision because it relies on the "ambiguous
concept of 'access to functionality.""' The Commission also held Microsoft's
160. Id. at 60-61.
161. Commission Decision, supra note 12,91743.
162. Id. 1744.
163. Council Directive 91/250, supra note 152 (the Directive states its provisions do not preclude
application of competition rules under the EC Treaty).
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view must be rejected because "inter-operability, by its very nature, relates to a
two-way relationship."
' 72
The Commission determined this case was one in which a dominant supplier
refused to supply necessary interoperability information as envisioned in the
Directive.'73 While the Commission did not find that this meant Microsoft's
behavior was automatically abusive,' 74 it did find the Directive's express mention
of refusal to supply interoperability information as a possible violation of Article
82 "[was] not inconsequential for [its] analysis.'
7
1
The Commission found Microsoft's behavior satisfied the four requirements
established by the ECJ in IMS. Despite Microsoft's claims, the Commission
found there were no realistic substitutes for disclosure that would enable
Microsoft's competitors to develop products capable of full interoperability with
Windows-based client PCs.'76 Microsoft put forward three categories of
substitutes for the interoperability information: use of open industry standards;
distribution of client-side software on the client PC; and reverse engineering of
Microsoft products.' 7 After discussing the viability of each suggestion,'" the
Commission found none of them provided a realistic substitute for the requested
interoperability information.'7 9 Indeed, the indispensability requirement will often
be met in interface cases'80 and the Commission's finding "broadly accords with
existing precedent."'
8'1
The Commission found Microsoft's refusal to disclose the specifications put
competitors at such a strong competitive disadvantage that it created a risk of
elimination of competition in the server market.182 This determination is
influenced by two elements: Microsoft has an extraordinarily strong position in
the PC market and interoperability with a client PC operating system is of
significant competitive importance in the server market.' 83 The Commission
elaborated that risk of elimination of competition is sufficient to establish abusive
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where the market has strong network effects that would make reversing
elimination of competition difficult.'85
The Commission considered three factors to determine there was a risk of
elimination of competition in the server market: market share, uptake of
Windows 2000 technologies, and the uptake of alternatives to Windows.
86
Regarding the first factor, market share, the Commission acknowledged that
Microsoft's server market products have attained a dominant position in the
server market.187 In the span of a few years, Microsoft's main competitor has
gone from being an industry leader to a relatively minor player. 8 The significant
rise in market share of Microsoft products coincided with the release of the
Windows 2000 generation of PC and work group server operating systems, the
generation for which Microsoft has provided less interoperability specifications
than for prior generations. 8 9
The other two factors closely interrelate and work together to reduce
competition for Microsoft in the server market. As the market share of Windows
2000 grows, more customers will make use of the features present in the
Windows 2000 family of products not present in previous products. 19° Due to the
decreased interoperability information, it is increasingly difficult for non-
Microsoft work group servers to utilize these same features. '9' Utilization of the
new Windows 2000 features contributes to locking the client into a homogenous
Windows work group server platform. 192 The 2003 market enquiry conducted by
the Commission confirms this effect; out of more than one hundred enquiry
respondents, only seven planned to migrate their work group server system from
Windows to an alternative technology. 9'
The Commission's interpretation of the second IMS factor is a relaxation of
the standard as initially articulated. The requirement has been lowered from
actual elimination of competition to only a likelihood of elimination. This
lowering of the degree of exclusion required creates a more plaintiff-friendly
standard than the ECJ standard.
The Commission's interpretation of the third IMS factor was controversial.'94
The Commission analyzed the effect of Microsoft's refusal to supply the
information on technical development in the server market and the effect of the
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client PCs and non-Windows based work group servers tends to lock consumers
into a homogenous Windows based work group server system.' 96 This prevents
consumers from benefitting from innovative features developed by Microsoft's
competitors and discourages Microsoft's competitors from developing new
products.'97 Therefore, the Commission found Microsoft's behavior limited
technical development and prejudiced consumers.1"
The new interpretation of the third IMS factor is the most controversial
aspect of the decision. It "substantially lowers the bar for mandatory licensing in
respect of the 'new product' requirement, articulated in Magill and IMS." '99 The
new test has been described as a "'new features' rather than a 'new product"'
test.200 This new interpretation is "far-reaching" because "[i]t is very rare in the IT
sector for two competing products to have the same feature set.,
20 '
According to the Commission, the "natural remedy" to Microsoft's behavior
was an order to supply the interoperability information. 202 The Commission
ordered Microsoft to disclose "complete and accurate specifications for the
protocols used by Windows work group servers" to provide work group services
to Windows work group networks.2 3 This disclosure covered interactions
between both a Windows client PC and a Windows server including interactions
between two or more Windows servers.2°' The Commission noted that there is no
need for Microsoft to disclose its implementations of the specifications it is• • 201
required to disclose.
Next, the Commission discussed the extent of the disclosure requirement.
The Commission noted that since interoperability with future purchases is
important for the consumer, the disclosure requirement "appl[ies] in a
prospective manner to future generations of Microsoft[] products. 2 6 Therefore,
the information will "have to be updated each time Microsoft intends to bring to
market new versions of its relevant products. 2 7
Furthermore, the disclosure order is "not limited to disclosing specifications
but also encompasses authorising the implementation of such specifications in
work group server operating system products. 2 8 The Commission, in passing,
stated, "to the extent [the] Decision might require Microsoft to refrain from fully
196. Id. 9 694.
197. Id.
198. Id. 9701.
199. Batchelor, supra note 180, at 18.
200. Id.
201. Id.
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enforcing any of its intellectual property rights, [it] would be justified by the need
to put an end to the [abusive behavior] .2°9
The specifications disclosure must be conducted in a non-discriminatory,
timely manner as determined by the Commission. The disclosures must be made
to "any undertaking having an interest in offering work group server operating
system products.",2' This is necessary to avoid "introducing new distortions of
,,21
competition. Microsoft must disclose present specifications within one
hundred and twenty days2 and disclose future specifications when Microsoft
makes future products available to customers for beta testing.2 3  Some
commentators have suggested that the approach taken by the EU and U.S.
parallels that taken when addressing public utilities and that Microsoft is now a
regulated monopoly.24
VIII. EFFECT OF DECISION
The Court of First Instance opinion was a controversial decision. The
decision is the largest EU antitrust judgment to date 2 " and is a major victory for
the Commission.1 6 A loss by the Commission would have "neuter[ed the] anti-
competition department.",217 The ramifications of the decision on competition
within the EU and around the globe are unclear. Some commentators argue the
decision was an important step toward increasing consumer freedom and
218
producing innovation. Others argue the decision will stifle innovation in the
219
software industry.
This Comment argues the effect of the decision will be two-fold: (1)
competition in the technology and software industries will increase and (2) the
EU will become the dominant regulatory body with which technology and
software companies must contend.





214. See First, supra note 59, at 1412-15.
215. Microsoft Loses Landmark EU Antitrust Case, AFP, Sep. 17, 2007, http://afp.google.com/article/
ALeqM5hWORIEve6gfkOCCQPI ILhJNEyaQ. Since the CFI decision, the Commission fined Microsoft an
additional $1.4 billion for noncompliance. EU Fines Microsoft $1.4B in Antitrust Case, NPR, Feb. 27, 2008,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=57554288.
216. EU Court Defeats Microsoft in Antitrust Case, NPR, Sep. 17, 2007, http://www.npr.org/templates/
story/story.php?storyld= 14465160.
217. David Charter, Comment: Microsoft Ruling Will Give Consumers Wider Choice, TIMES ONLINE,
Sep. 17, 2007, http://technology.timesonline.co.uk/tollnews/tech and-web/article2473601.ece.
218. Id.
219. Phillip Marsden, Legal Analysis: Gloomy Prospects for European Innovation, TIMES ONLINE, Sep.
17, 2007, http://business.timesonline.co.uk/to/businesslaw/article2476178.ece.
Global Business & Development Law Journal/ Vol. 21
A. Increased Competition
The requirement that Microsoft disclose its interoperability information with
competitors will lead to increased competition in the technology and software
industries. Prior to the Windows 2000 family of products, Microsoft disclosed
interoperability information similar to that which it is required to disclose by the
EU decision . Increased competition will result from the increased market share
of Microsoft's competitors that results from Microsoft having to compete on the
merits.
Analysis of the market prior to Microsoft's denial of interoperability
information is indicative of the competitive environment that is likely to prevail
after the required disclosure. Microsoft's market share has grown from 55.6
percent in 2000 to 66.4 percent in 2002.22' This growth has come at the expense
of Microsoft's chief rival, Novell, whose market share fell from 33.3 percent to
22223.6 percent over the same period. Furthermore, Sun and other companies that
have attempted to enter the market have had limited success because of
223interoperability issues.
When Microsoft is forced to disclose the interoperability information it has
withheld, customers will choose based on the merits instead of being improperly
influenced by interoperability issues. Microsoft has made the decreased
interoperability between Windows client PCs and non-Windows servers a focus
of its marketing materials; this decreased interoperability is the direct result of
Microsoft's practice of discontinuing its disclosure of interoperability
information. 224 Seventy-five percent of the respondents to the Commission's
market inquiry considered interoperability with Windows client PCs an important
factor in purchasing decisions. 221 In the second Mercer survey, 226 seventy-four
percent of the respondents considered interoperability an important factor in
making purchasing decisions; of those respondents, sixty-eight percent ranked
interoperability a four or five on a scale of five. 27
This focus on interoperability, a result of Microsoft's discontinued
disclosure, has skewed the decision making process away from choice on
performance and other purely competitive factors. The results of the Mercer
surveys reveal that UNIX, which has the highest rating on performance qualities,
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ranks below Windows in market share. 22 As the Mercer surveys reveal,
Microsoft is not considered the best server system in terms of performance and
reliability.2 9  Requiring the disclosure will free consumers from the
interoperability considerations that currently drive them toward a "homogeneous
Windows solution. '230
B. Incentive to Innovate
Microsoft claimed that requiring disclosure would reduce its incentives to
innovate.2 1' The Commission stated that, when analyzing the effect of disclosing
the interoperability information requested by Sun, Microsoft's incentive to
innovate the entire product, not just the interoperability protocols, must be
considered.232 The Commission elaborated that the assessment "must be
conducted in comparison to the alternative situation where Microsoft's anti-
competitive behaviour remains unfettered. 233
The Commission found that, in the situation where Microsoft's behavior is
not restricted, "there is a serious risk that Microsoft will succeed in eliminating
all effective competition in the [server] market. 23 4 According to the Commission,
this would have "a significant ... negative effect on its incentives to innovate"
because "Microsoft's research and development efforts are indeed spurred by the
innovative steps its competitors take in the [server] market., 23 The Commission
found disclosure of the interoperability information will "liven up" the
competitive landscape.236 It found "Microsoft would no longer benefit from a
lock-in effect that drives consumers towards a homogenous Microsoft solution,
and such competitive pressure would increase Microsoft's own incentives to
innovate., 237 Furthermore, the Commission found "it is dubious whether an order
to supply ... would have any negative impact on Microsoft's incentives to
innovate. 238
Requiring Microsoft to disclose the interoperability information at issue in
the decision will not stifle innovation in the technology and software industries.
Microsoft and various industry observers claim that the EU decision will reduce
the incentives for companies to innovate. This claim is belied both by
228. Id. 1 662. UNIX is the highest rated when each characteristic is weighted by its relative importance
according to the consumers in the surveys. Id.
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Microsoft's experience as a result of the U.S. settlement and the general practice
of the technology and software industries.
Microsoft's experience as a result of forced disclosure pursuant to its
settlement of the U.S. antitrust case is indicative of the outcome that can be
expected because of the EU decision. The U.S. settlement required Microsoft to
disclose protocols implemented in certain Windows desktop operating systems
and used to interoperate or communicate natively with Microsoft server operating
system products.! As in the EU decision, the U.S. settlement required Microsoft
make the disclosures in a reasonable, non-discriminatory manner.240
Microsoft did not lose incentive to innovate because of the disclosure made
pursuant to the U.S. settlement. At the Oral Hearing in the Commission case,
Microsoft confirmed it had not noticed any negative impact on its incentives to
innovate because of the disclosures made pursuant to the Communications
Protocol Program.14 ' While it is true that the EU decision requires disclosure that
is more extensive than that of the U.S. settlement, there is no reason to believe
this will stifle Microsoft's incentive to innovate. The required communications
protocols disclosures are similar to those required under the U.S. settlement. The
primary difference is that under the EU decision, Microsoft must allow the
disclosed protocols to be used to develop a work group server product. While this
will lead to increased competition for Microsoft, it will spur its incentive to
innovate, as it will no longer to be able to maintain its market lead without
genuine product innovation and performance.
C. Industry Practice
In the EU case, Microsoft argued it is common practice in the software
industry to withhold interface information.242 The Commission found disclosure
of interoperability information is "not exceptional" 243 and "the economic
characteristics of software markets actually suggest that industry practice is often
interoperability oriented." 2" The Commission noted that Microsoft itself provided
interoperability information "when its position in the [server] market was still
marginal." 245 Microsoft went so far as to "disclose[] source code in order to
promote its programming models and communication standards. 246
Microsoft's experience with prior disclosure and industry practice are
inconsistent with their claim that requiring interoperability information will
239. Microsoft I1, No. 98-1232, 2006 WL 2882808, at *4 (D.D.C. Sep. 7, 2006).
240. Id.
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reduce incentives to innovate. Sharing interoperability information and utilizing
industry standards instead of developing proprietary standards is in fact industry
practice.247 Indeed, Microsoft's behavior prior to becoming the dominant force in
the server market was to share interoperability information with competitors.48
Given that Microsoft retained its ability to innovate when it followed the
industry practice of providing interoperability information, there is no reason to
believe following industry practice again will suddenly remove its incentive to
innovate. Furthermore, given that Microsoft did not experience any loss of
incentive to innovate because of the U.S. disclosure program, there is no reason
to think the EU disclosure program will cause Microsoft to lose incentive to
innovate. The increased competition the disclosure will provide will serve as an
incentive for Microsoft to innovate in order to maintain its market lead.
Microsoft has acknowledged independently of the EU case that disclosure of
interoperability information will not reduce its incentive to innovate, but, in fact,
will strengthen Microsoft's products. In a recent whitepaper on interoperability,
Microsoft stated that its disclosure program "represent[s] a new and strategic
approach.., to licensing its intellectual property. '249  According to the
whitepaper, "Microsoft aims to expand the market for its products and those of
its partners, and to broaden industry support for Microsoft platforms."'25
Microsoft also noted customers would benefit "because this expanded licensing
program results in greater product choice, more assured interoperability, lower
total cost of ownership, and easier and faster integration of products from
multiple vendors."25'
D. Emergence of the EU as the Leading Anti-Trust Regulatory Body
The effect of the EU decision will not be limited to competition within the
server market. This decision will lead to increased competition throughout the
whole of the technology and software industries. The EU has already taken a
more aggressive approach to antitrust regulation than the U.S. From the time of
the initial Commission decision finding Microsoft guilty of abusive behavior and
the CFI decision upholding the Commission's ruling, the Commission has
expanded antitrust investigations against Intel and Qualcomm for similar abusive
247. Id. 732-33. For an explanation of'standardization in the technology industry and its effect, see
Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust and the Internet Standardization Problem, 28 CONN. L. REV. 1041, 1043-54 (1996).
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behavior.252 Antitrust Chief Neelie Kroes sees the CFI decision as an endorsement
of the more aggressive attitude and approach taken by the Commission.!
Beyond increasing competition in both the EU and around the globe, the CFI
decision upholding the Commission's findings positions the Commission and the
EU as the global leaders in antitrust regulation and enforcement. Indeed, the
different approaches taken by the U.S. and the EU in their antitrust cases against
Microsoft provide the groundwork for the EU to become the leading antitrust
regulatory body. If the EU continues to apply a higher level of scrutiny and
place stricter regulation on companies than the U.S., the requirements of the EU
will become the de facto global standard for behavior.255
The different approach is evidenced by the level of disclosure required under
the EU decision as opposed to the U.S. settlement, including the difference in
terms of the EU requirement and the U.S. settlement. Not only is the EU
decision's scope of disclosure broader than the U.S. settlement, it is also more
stringent in the length of the required disclosure. These two factors demonstrate a
more aggressive EU approach that the Commission will likely utilize in future
and pending antitrust cases.
The U.S. settlement requires Microsoft to disclose "any Communications
Protocol that is ... used to interoperate, or communicate, natively ... with a
Microsoft server operating system product. '256 The disclosure is limited to
protocols "implemented in a Windows [o]perating [s]ystem [p]roduct installed on
a client computer. ',1 7 The settlement expressly limits use of the disclosed
protocols to interoperating with a Windows client PC; expressly prohibited is use
of the protocols to allow a non-Windows server to interoperate with a Windows
server.5 Furthermore, the duration of the required disclosure is limited; it expires
on November 12, 20099
In contrast to the U.S. decision, the EU decision establishes more rigorous
disclosure requirements and does not include an end date for the required
disclosure. The decision requires Microsoft to disclose "complete and accurate
specifications" of the protocols used by Windows work group servers to provide
work group services; this disclosure includes both client PC-to-server
260communication and server-to-server communication. The decision also
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expressly requires Microsoft to allow competitors to implement the disclosed
specifications in work group servers. 6' In addition to requiring more extensive
disclosure, the EU decision imposes more stringent temporal requirements, both
backward and forward-looking. Microsoft is required to disclose specifications
for any product for which it still provides online self-help support 262 (older
product lines not currently marketed by Microsoft) as well as any future product
developed by Microsoft . Interestingly, the decision places no time limit on the
required disclosure.264
The EU decision subjects Microsoft to more extensive disclosure
requirements than the U.S. settlement. The most noticeable difference between
the two disclosure requirements concerns work group servers. The U.S.
settlement specifically disallowed use of the disclosed specifications to allow a
non-Windows work group server to interoperate with a Windows work group
server as well as a Windows work group server, whereas the primary intention
of the EU decision is to allow a Microsoft competitor to develop a work group
server that will interoperate with Windows client PCs and Windows work group
servers as well as a Windows work group server.66
The difference in approach between the EU and U.S. Microsoft decisions is
indicative of the distinct overall treatment of the intersection of antitrust and IP
taken by the two jurisdictions. One U.S. antitrust official described the EU
Microsoft decision as "protecting competitors, not competition, in ways that may
ultimately harm innovation and the consumers that benefit from it. ' 267 The focus
of antitrust law in the U.S. is efficiency.2 68 This focus on efficiency is the "legacy
of the Chicago School of Law and Economics. 2 69 Although only some of the
school's economic theory was accepted in mainstream analysis, "the pro-market
and largely anti-government Chicago School approach had significant and lasting
consequences for the U.S. antitrust analysis. 21 0 On the other hand, the EU and
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"perceive [the] competition process as vulnerable and are more eager to address
perceived distortions. 27'
U.S. antitrust officials "see little scope for antitrust policy to mitigate the
consequences of imperfect IP policies. '7  They are reluctant to intervene in IP
policy and believe "any competitive concerns are better remedied by changes in
the IP policy. '273 In comparison, the Commission and the ECJ "see a role for
competition law to correct improvidently defined IPRs, even if it entails adjusting
competition principles. 274 Even Bronner, where the ECJ adopted its most narrow
reading of the essential facilities doctrine, "goes further than the U.S. Supreme
Court in Trinko.",27' At least one commentator, however, has suggested the ECJ
should follow the lead of the Supreme Court in Trinko and limit the application
of the essential facilities doctrine in Article 82 cases.2 76
The U.S. and EU Microsoft decisions demonstrate a clear difference in
approach to regulation where IP and antitrust intersect. The more aggressive
approach taken by the EU will present software and technology companies with a
choice: produce a different version of their products for the EU than for the U.S.,
or market an EU compliant version worldwide. Economies of scale as well as
other business considerations suggest companies will choose the latter.277
IX. CONCLUSION
Microsoft is the world's largest technology company with dominant market
share in most of its product markets. This dominance has not come without
difficulties, namely, allegations of antitrust abuse. Microsoft has been
investigated for violation of antitrust law in the both the U.S. and the EU. The
difference in the outcome of the two cases is illustrative of the difference
between the two jurisdictions in antitrust and IP policy.
The antitrust/IP policy of the U.S. favors upholding IP rights. The Supreme
Court is unlikely to find a violation of antitrust laws based solely on behavior that
is consistent with already granted IPRs. Although there are limited circumstances
where U.S. courts will find abuse of antitrust law in situations involving IPRs,
they are much less likely to find an abuse than the EU.
The EU antitrust/IP policy favors antitrust enforcement over IP rights. The
EU is more likely than the U.S. to find refusal to license IP an abuse of an
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entity's dominant position. The EU recognizes and applies the essential facilities
doctrine, a doctrine not recognized by the Supreme Court. Recognition of this
doctrine makes it significantly easier for a court to find an antitrust violation.
The EU Microsoft case is the latest step in the evolution of the EU's essential
facilities doctrine. The decision provides a reinterpretation of the test outlined in
IMS. This reinterpretation is more plaintiff-friendly. Indeed, a significantly
lowered standard has been applied to two of the IMS factors.
The EU Microsoft decision will have two significant implications. First, it
will lead to increased competition in the software and technology industries.
Requiring disclosure of interoperability information by dominant entities will
prevent monopoly leveraging and ensure consumers are free to choose based on
the merits of products and not artificial constraints created by the dominant firm.
Disclosure of interoperability information will not reduce incentives to innovate.
The economic characteristics of the technology industry as well as industry
practice indicate that disclosing interoperability information does not reduce
incentive to innovate.
The second implication of the EU Microsoft decision is that it will establish
the EU as the dominant antitrust regulatory body with which technology firms
must contend. The decision by the CFI upholding the Commission's decision has
emboldened the Commission in its antitrust policy. The CFI decision approves of
the more aggressive antitrust approach taken by the EU to as compared to that of
the U.S. If the behavior of the Commission since the Microsoft decision and the
statements of Ms. Kroes are any indication, the EU is moving full steam ahead
toward becoming the world's foremost antitrust enforcer.
